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1 Reader’s Guide: Abbreviations and Notation
1. A 7→ B denotes the relation ‘A entails B as an immediate consequence.’
2. S A denotes ‘A is a logical truth of formal system S.’
3. `S A denotes ‘A is provable in formal system S.’
4. ' denotes ‘same cardinality’ (e.g., A ' B)
2 Foundations from Symbolic Logic
1. Adequacy of connectives: The set {∼,⊃} is adequate.
2. DeMorgan’s Laws:
∼ (A ∧B) ≡ ∼ A ∨ ∼ B
∼ (A ∨B) ≡ ∼ A ∧ ∼ B
3. Material Implication: p ⊃ q ≡ ∼ p ∨ q
4. Exportation: p ⊃ q ⊃ r ≡ (p ∧ q) ⊃ r
5. Transposition (equivalence of a conditional and its contrapositive–mixing of the in-
verse and the converse): p ⊃ q ≡ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p
6. : p iff q ≡ ∼ p iff ∼ q
3 Syntactic Notions
1. Formal Language: A formal language L is specified by
(a) a set of symbols known as the alphabet of L
(b) a set of formation rules or rules of formation determining which sequences of
symbols from the language’s alphabet are wffs (well-formed formulas) in the lan-
guage.
A formal language can be
(a) completed defined without reference to any interpretation for it and
(b) identified with the set of its wffs.
2. Rule of Formation: A rule of formation determines which sequences of symbols from
the alphabet of a formal language are wffs.
3. Deductive Apparatus: A deductive apparatus can consist of
(a) axioms and/or
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(b) rules of inference (also know as transformation rules).
It must be definable without reference to any intended interpretation of the language:
otherwise the system is not a formal system. E.g., Modus Ponens.
4. Formal System: A formal system S is
(a) a formal language L, and
(b) a deductive apparatus.
5. Axiom: An axiom is a wff of a formal system determined by its designer.
6. Rule of Inference: A rule of inference determines which relations between formulas of
L are relations of immediate (deductive) consequence in S. Defined with the 7→ (‘entails
as an immediate consequence’) relation.
7. Proof in a Formal System: A proof in a formal system of a formula A is
(a) a finite, but non-empty, string of wffs of the formal language,
(b) which satisfies certain purely syntactic requirements and has no meaning, and
(c) where the last formula in the string is A, and
(d) each wff in the string is either
i. an axiom of the formal system, or
ii. an immediate consequence by the rule of inference of the system of any two
wffs preceding it in the string.
8. Theorem of a Formal System: A theorem of a formal system is a wff (formula)
of a formal language that satisfies certain purely syntactic requirements and has no
meaning. A is a theorem of a system S if `S A (i.e., if there is some proof in S whose
last formula is A). Every axiom is a theorem, but not every theorem is an axiom.
9. Theorem about a Formal System: A theorem about a formal system (also called
a metatheorem) is a true statement about the system, expressed in the metalanguage.
It cannot be proved within the system.
10. Syntax: Having to do with formal languages or formal systems without essential
regard to their interpretation. Slightly wider than ‘proof-theoretic’ since it can be
applied to properties of formal languages without deductive apparatuses, as well as to
formal systems.
11. Finitary Formal System: A finite formal system (ffs) has the following properties:
(a) alphabet is countable (finite or denumerable).
(b) wffs are finite in length.
(c) rules of inference have finitely many premises (e.g., Modus Ponens has only 2).
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12. Derivation: A derivation of a formula A in PS from a set Γ of wffs of P is
(a) a finite, but non-empty, string of wffs of P ,
(b) where the last formula in the string is A, and
(c) each wff in the string is either
i. an axiom of PS,
ii. the result of applying mp to any two wffs preceding it in the string, or
iii. a member of the set Γ
The concept of a derivation addresses the desire to prove things from a set of assump-
tions.
13. Difference between a derivation and a proof :
(a) In a proof in PS every formula is a theorem of PS.
(b) In a derivation in PS formulas may occur in the string that are not theorems of
PS (e.g., formulas from Γ, if Γ is a set of formulas that are not theorems of PS).
14. Syntactic consequence: A formula A is a syntactic consequence in PS of a set of Γ
of formulas of P [Γ `PS A] iff there is a derivation in PS of A from the set Γ.
15. Proof-theoretic consistent (or p-consistent or p-Con): A set Γ of formulas is
p-Con (denoted by Con Γ) iff for no wff A, Γ ` A and Γ `∼ A.
16. Proof-theoretic inconsistent (or p-inconsistent): A set Γ of formulas is p-inconsistent
iff for some wff A of P both Γ ` A and Γ `∼ A.
17. Deduction Theorem for PS: if Γ, A `PS B, then Γ `PS A ⊃ B
18. Simple consistency: A formal system S is simply consistent iff for no formula A of
S are both A and ∼ A theorems of S (i.e., the deductive apparatus of S will not lead
to contradictions).
19. Absolute consistency: A formal system S is absolutely consistent if at least one
formula of S is not a theorem of S (i.e., ∃A s.t. 2 A).
20. Maximally p-consistent: Γ is a maximally p-consistent set of PS (denoted by
MaxCon Γ) iff
(a) Con Γ, and
(b) any for any arbitrary formula A of P , if A /∈ Γ, then Con Γ ∪ {A}. I.e.,
if A is any arbitrary formula of P , then either
i. A ∈ Γ or
ii. Con Γ ∪ {A} (i.e., Γ ∪ {A} `PS B and Γ ∪ {A} `PS∼ B for some formula B
of P).
A MaxCon set is the biggest possible p-consistent set of wffs. The concept of a max-
imally p-consistent set was introduced by Henkin to help prove the completeness of
PS.
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3.1 Syntactic Meta-theorems of PS
1. A ` A
2. If Γ ` A, then Γ ∪∆ ` A (Augmentation)
3. If Γ ` A and A ` B, then Γ ` B
4. If Γ ` A and Γ ` A ⊃ B, then Γ ` B (Meta-mp)
5. If ` A, then Γ ` A
6. ` A iff ∅ ` A
7. Γ ` A iff ∆ ⊆ Γ and ∆ ` A (if A ∈ Γ, then Γ ` A; A is the derivation)
8. Con Γ ∪ {∼ A} iff Γ ` A ≡ Con Γ ∪ {∼ A} iff Γ 0 A
9. Con Γ ∪ {A} iff Γ `∼ A ≡ Con Γ ∪ {A} iff Γ 0∼ A
10. Fullness of MaxCon sets: For any MaxCon set Γ, exactly one of A or ∼ A is in Γ.
11. Maximally p-consistent (alternate way): Γ is a maximally p-consistent set of PS (de-
noted by MaxCon Γ) iff
(a) Con Γ, and
(b) Γ is full (i.e., for any arbitrary wff A of PS, either A ∈ Γ or ∼ A ∈ Γ, but not
both).
12. Deductive closure of MaxCon sets: For any MaxCon set Γ and any formula A, if
Γ `PS A, then A ∈ Γ (implies every theorem is in a MaxCon set; if ` A and MaxCon Γ,
then A ∈ Γ).
13. Enumeration Theorem for P : The wffs of P are effectively enumerable (i.e., given
an arbitrary wff, ∃ an effective method for determining its position in the enumeration,
and given a position in the enumeration, an effective method exists for determining to
which wff it refers).
14. (32.12) Lindenbaum’s Lemma: if Con Γ, then ∃ a set of wffs ∆ s.t. Γ ⊆ ∆ and
MaxCon ∆ (i.e., informally, every Con set is a subset of a MaxCon set).
4 Foundations from Discrete Mathematics
1. Effective method: An effective method for solving a problem is a method for com-
puting the answer that, if followed correctly and as far as may be necessary, is logically
bound to give the right answer (and no wrong answers) in a finite number of steps.
2. Decidable set: A set is decidable iff there is an effective method for telling, for each
item that might be a member of the set, whether or not it really is a member.
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3. Finite set: A set is finite iff it has only a finite number of members.
Every finite set is decidable.
4. Denumerable set: A set is denumerable iff there is a 1–1 correspondence between it
and the set of natural numbers (so a denumerable set is an infinite set).
5. Countable set: A set is countable iff it is either finite or denumerable (so an un-
countable set is an infinite set).
6. Sequence: A sequence is an ordering of objects, called terms in the sequence.
7. Enumeration: An enumeration of a set A is a finite or denumerable sequence of which
every member of A is a term and every term is a member of A (e.g., the sequences
≺ 3, 1, 2  and ≺ 1, 2, 3, 1  are both enumerations of the set {1, 2, 3}.
8. Effective enumeration: An effective enumeration is an enumeration which is finite
or for which there is an effective method for telling what the nth term is, for positive
integer n (Every finite enumeration is effective, because there is an effective method—
remember it need not be known to anyone—for enumerating the members of any finite
set).
9. The Power Set Axiom: For every set there exists its power set. Used to establish the
relationship between the cardinality of a set and its power set (i.e., S¯ < ¯P (S)). Also
used to establish that there are sets with cardinal numbers greater than ℵ1 = 2ℵ0 = c.
10. The Continuum Hypothesis: There is no cardinal number greater than ℵ0 and
smaller than ℵ1 = 2ℵ0 = c (has yet to be proved).
4.1 Reductio proof of the uncountability of P (N)
Any alleged 1–1 correspondence between P (N) and N entails stating that ∃ a list or enumer-
ation L = {s0, s1, s2, . . . , sm, . . .} of the subsets of N.
Claim: There is a subset of N, call it D¯, which cannot be included in L.
Definition: Define D¯ as, for each n ∈ N, n ∈ D¯ iff n /∈ sn.
Spoze: D¯ ∈ L. Say D¯ = sm for some natural number m.
Case 1: m ∈ D¯. By definition of D¯, m /∈ sm, and then m /∈ D¯ since we have spozed D¯ = sm.
Case 2: m /∈ D¯. So then m /∈ sm because we have spozed that D¯ = sm, and then m ∈ D¯
by definition of D¯.
Case 1 and 2 together yield m ∈ D¯ iff m /∈ D¯. This is a contradiction.
∴ P (N) is not denumerable. It also is not finite since it contains denumerably
many unit (singleton) sets.
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Since P (N) is neither finite, nor denumerable, it is uncountable.
4.2 Cardinality of some common sets
1. The power set of the set of natural numbers, i.e., P (N), is uncountable (ℵ1).
2. The set of truths of the full theory of N is uncountable (ℵ1).
3. The set of theorems of a ffs of the full theory of N is denumerable (ℵ0).
4. The set of all finite strings of 1’s and 0’s (or +’s and -’s) is denumerable (ℵ0).
5. The set of all denumerable strings of 1’s and 0’s (or +’s and -’s) that from some point
on are all 0’s is denumerable (ℵ0).
6. The set of all denumerable strings of 1’s and 0’s (or +’s and -’s) is uncountable (ℵ1).
7. The set of all finite subsets of N is denumerable (ℵ0).
8. The set of truths of the full theory of arithmetic is uncountable (ℵ1).
9. The set of irrational numbers (i.e., the real numbers (ℵ1) minus the rational num-
bers (ℵ0); those numbers which cannot be expressed as a ratio of two integers, e.g., pi
or
√
2) is uncountable (ℵ1).
4.3 Theorems about infinite sets
1. Any subset of a countable set is countable.
2. The union of a denumerable set and a finite set is denumerable.
3. The union of a denumerable set and a denumerable is a denumerable set.
4. The union of a countable set and a finite set is countable.
5. The union of a countable set and a countable set is countable.
6. The removal from an uncountable set of countably many members leaves an uncount-
able set remaining.
5 Semantic Notions
1. Semantics: Having to do with the interpretation of formal languages or simply ‘model-
theoretic.’
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2. Interpretation: An interpretation of a formal language is an assignment of meanings
to its symbols and/or wffs.
An interpretation of P is an assignment to each propositional symbol of P of one or
the other (but not both) of the truth values truth and falsity, and an assignment to
the connectives of P of their usual truth-functional meanings.
3. Model Theory: Model theory is the theory of interpretation of formal languages (i.e.,
I A).
4. Model: A model of a wff (formula) of a language is an interpretation of the language
for which the formula comes out true.
5. Semantic consequence: A formula B of P is a semantic consequence of a formula
A (or a set Γ of formulas) of P [A PS B] ([Γ PS B]) iff there is no interpretation of
P for which A (every formula in Γ) is true and B is false.
6. Model-theoretic consistency: A formula or set Γ of formulas is model-theoretically
consistent (or m-consistent or m-Con or satisfiable; denoted by Sat Γ) iff it has a
model (∀A ∈ Γ,I A).
7. Model-theoretic inconsistency (or m-inconsistent): A formula or set Γ of for-
mulas is model-theoretically inconsistent (or m-inconsistent or unsatisfiable; denoted
by Sat Γ) iff it has no model (i.e., ∃A, s.t. 2I A).
5.1 Definition of true for an interpretation of P
Let I be an interpretation of P , and A and B any formulas of P . Then:
1. If A is a propositional symbol, then A is true for I iff I assigns the truth value truth
to A.
2. ∼ A is true for I iff A is not true for I.
3. (A ⊃ B) is true for I iff either A is not true for I or B is true for I (i.e., A ⊃ B P∼
A ∨B).
5.2 Theorems about truth-functional propositional logic
1. ∅ P A iff P A (A is a tautology).
2. For any given interpretation a given formula is either true or false.
3. No formula is both true or false for the same interpretation.
4. A is false for a given interpretation iff ∼ A is true for that interpretation; and A is
true for a given interpretation iff ∼ A is false for that interpretation.
9
5. If A and A ⊃ B are both true for a given interpretation, then B is true for that
interpretation (Modus Ponens).
6. If P A and P A ⊃ B, then P B.
7. B is a semantic consequence of A iff A ⊃ B is logically valid: i.e., A P B iff P A ⊃ B.
5.3 Some truths about P. The Interpolation Theorem for P
1. A P A
2. If Γ P A, then Γ ∪∆ P A
3. If Γ P A and A P B, then Γ P B
4. If Γ P A and Γ P A ⊃ B, then Γ P B (Meta-mp)
5. If P A, then Γ P A
6. SAT Γ ∪ {∼ A} iff Γ  A ≡ SAT Γ ∪ {∼ A} iff Γ 2 A
7. SAT Γ ∪ {A} iff Γ ∼ A ≡ SAT Γ ∪ {A} iff Γ 2∼ A
6 Linkage between Syntax and Semantics
1. Completeness: A formal system is complete if you could prove all of its tautolo-
gies (truths) within the system (i.e., if N A then `N A).
2. Completeness of a ffs of N: A ffs of N is complete iff all truths of N are provable
in the ffs (i.e., `N A iff N A).
(a) if `N A then N A (soundness)
(b) if N A then `N A (completeness)
3. Incompleteness of a ffs of N: A ffs of N is incomplete if there are truths of N,
i.e., N A, and yet not `N A.
4. A ffs of N: A ffs of N is a formal system some or all of whose theorems can be
interpreted as expressing truths of N.
5. Full theory of N: A full theory of N is all truths of N (e.g., full theory of propositional
logic ≡ all tautologies).
7 Soundness and Completeness of PS
7.1 Soundness of PS: if `PS A, then PS A
(Every theorem is a tautology; if a wff is provable (there is a proof for it in PS), then A is a
valid (true) wff under all interpretations I of PS (∀I of PS, I A)).
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7.2 Semantic Completeness of PS (‘The Big Picture’): if PS A,
then `PS A
(Every tautology is a theorem; if a wff A is a valid (true) wff under all interpretations I of
PS (∀I of PS, I A), then A is provable (there is a proof for it in PS))
(32.13)
CON Gamma
and MaxCON Delta
Gamma subset Delta if MaxCON Delta,
then SAT Delta
SAT Gamma
if CON Gamma, then SAT Gamma
(syntax) (semantics)
L.L. for Ps
(32.12)
Goal: if PS A, then `PS A
1. Says, ‘if a wff A is valid (true) under all interpretations I of PS, then A is a theo-
rem (i.e., it can be proved or there exists a proof in PS for A).
2. We get 1) by proving ‘strong completeness’: if Γ PS A, then Γ `PS A
(which means Γ = ∅).
3. We get 2) by proving if Con Γ, then SAT Γ (difficult) and with 32.8.
4. We get 3) by Lindenbaum’s Lemma and by showing that MaxCon ∆ has a model.
7.2.1 Corollaries from Semantic Completeness of PS
1. Syntactic finiteness: an infinite Γ ` A iff ∃ a finite ∆, where ∆ ⊆ Γ, s.t. ∆ ` A
2. Semantic finiteness: an infinite Γ  A iff ∃ a finite ∆, where ∆ ⊆ Γ, s.t. ∆  A
3. Syntactic compactness: If for every finite subset ∆ of Γ, Con ∆, then Con Γ.
4. Semantic compactness: If for every finite subset ∆ of Γ, SAT ∆, then SAT Γ.
7.3 Decidability of PS
1. Decidability of a system: A system S is decidable if, for any wff A of S, there is an
effective (algorithmic) method for determining if A is a theorem of S (`S A).
PS is decidable.
We only have effective methods (e.g., truth tables and trees) on the semantic side for de-
termining whether a wff A is valid or not. There are no effective methods for constructing
proofs (syntactic side). It is only by semantic completeness that we can determine whether
A is a theorem.
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7.4 Informal proof of the incompleteness of a ffs of the full theory
of N
1. There are uncountably many truths of a full theory of N.
(a) For each member S of P (N), which is uncountable, there is a truth (e.g., for each
n ∈ N, either n ∈ S or n /∈ S).
2. Any ffs has only denumerably many wffs and thus only denumerably many theorems
because all wffs are theorems.
(a) A ℵ0 alphabet has no greater expressive capacity than a finite alphabet or even a
2-symbol alphabet.
(b) Since each distinct finitely long wff can be represented as sequence containing no
more than 2 distinct symbols, each wff can be mapped to a natural number, and
thus the set of wffs is denumerable.
∴ Any ffs of a full theory of N is incomplete. There are uncountably many truths (ℵ1)
of N that do not match up with the denumerably many theorems (ℵ0) of a ffs of the
full theory of N.
For n distinct propositional symbols there are 2n distinct possible interpretations.
Since P has ℵ0 (i.e., denumerably many) propositional symbols, there are 2ℵ0 = c (and so
uncountably many) distinct possible interpretations of P .
There are 22
n
truth functions of n arguments.
8 Quantified (Predicate) Logic: QS
8.1 Semantic Notions
1. An interpretation of Q consists in the specification of some non-empty set (called the
domain of the interpretation) and the following assignments:
(a) To each propositional symbol is assigned one or the other (but not both) of truth
values truth and falsity.
(b) To each individual constant is assigned some member of the domain of the inter-
pretation.
(c) To each function symbol is assigned a function with arguments and values in the
domain.
(d) To each predicate symbol is assigned some property or relation defined for objects
in the domain.
The connectives are given their usual truth-functional meanings.
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2. Satisfaction:
(a) If A is a propositional symbol, then s satisfies A iff I assigns the truth value
truth to A.
(b) If A is an atomic wff of the form F t1, . . . , tn, where F is an n-ary predicate
symbol and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then s satisfies A iff ≺ t1 ? s, . . . , tn ? s  is a
member of the set of ordered n-tuples assigned by I to F .
(c) If A is of the form ∼ B, then s satisfies A iff s does not satisfy B.
(d) If A is of the form (B ⊃ C), then s satisfies A iff either s does not satisfy B or s
does satisfy C.
(e) If A is of the form ∧vkB, where vk is the kth variable in our enumeration, then s
satisfies A iff every denumerable sequence of members of D that differs from s in
at most the kth term satisfies B.
3. A wff A of Q is true for a given interpretation I of Q iff every denumerable sequence
of members of the domain of I satisfies A.
4. A wff A of Q is false for a given interpretation I of Q iff no denumerable sequence of
members of the domain of I satisfies A.
5. A closed wff is a sentence.
6. ‘To satisfy’ does not mean ‘to make true,’ unless the wff is closed.
7. An interpretation I of Q is a model of a wff A of Q iff A is true for I (i.e., I A).
8. An interpretation I of Q is a model of a set Γ of wffs of Q iff every wff in Γ is true
of I iff A is true for I (i.e., if A ∈ Γ, then I A).
9. A formal system has a model iff the set of all its theorems has a model.
10. A wff A of Q is a logically valid wff of Q [Q A] iff A is true for every interpretation
of Q (i.e., for any I in Q, I A). [Remember that every interpretation of Q must, by
definition, have a non-empty domain.]
11. A wff A of Q is a semantic consequence of a set Γ of wffs of Q [Γ Q A] iff for every
interpretation of Q every sequence that satisfies every member of Γ also satisfies A
(i.e., there is no sequence that satisfies every member of Γ and does not satisfy A).
12. Progressive nature of Q
(a) s satisfies A
(b) A is true for I (I A)
(c) A is logically valid ( A; i.e., ∀s,∀I, sSATI)
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8.2 Semantic Meta-theorems for QS
1. (40.1) If  A then ∼ A is unsatisfiable.
2. (40.2) mp preserves satisfaction-by-s (i.e., if a sequence s satisfies A and also A ⊃ B,
then it also satisfies B.
3. (40.3) mp preserves truth-for-I (i.e., if A and A ⊃ B are both true for an interpretation
I, then B also is true for I.
4. (40.4) mp preserves logical validity (i.e., if A and A ⊃ B are both logically valid, then
so is B. Or: If Q A and Q A ⊃ B, then Q B.
5. (40.5) A is false (all sequences fail to satisfy A) for a given interpretation I iff ∼ A is
true for I; and A is true for I iff ∼ A is false for I.
6. (40.6) I A iff I ∧xA
7. (40.7) I A iff I Ac
8. (40.8)  A iff  Ac
9. (40.9) ∨xA is satisfiable for an I iff A is not satisfiable by I.
10. (40.10) Every instance of a tautological schema of Q (Q+) is logically valid.
11. (40.11) ∧xk(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (∧xkA ⊃ ∧xkB) is logically valid for arbitrary wffs A and B
and an arbitrary variable xk.
12. (40.13) If xk does not occur free in A, then A ⊃ ∧xkA logically valid (A an arbitrary
wff).
13. (40.16) ∧xkA ⊃ At/xk is logically valid if t is free for xk in A.
14. (40.17) If A is a closed wff, then exactly one of A or ∼ A is true for I and exactly one
false for I.
15. (40.18) If A and B are closed wffs, then I A ⊃ B iff 2I A or I B.
16. (40.19) If A and B are closed wffs, then 2I A ⊃ B iff I A or 2I B.
17. (40.20) If a wff A with exactly one free variable xk is true for I, then each wff that
results from substituting a closed term for the free occurrences of the variable is true
for I. In other words, if A is true for all, it is true for each instance.
18. (40.21) Let I be an interpretation with domain D. Let A be a wff with exactly one free
variable, xk. If each member of D is assigned by I to some closed term or another, and
At/xk is true for I for each closed term t, then ∧xkA is true for I. I.e., if I Bt/xk for
all members of D, then I ∧xkA.
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8.3 Syntactic Notions
1. Proof-theoretically consistent: Definitions, proof, Con, ` – same as in PS.
8.4 Syntactic Meta-theorems for QS
1. (43.1) The Deduction Theorem (if Γ, A ` B, then Γ ` (A ⊃ B)) holds for QS. as in
PS.
2. (43.2) if Γ ` (A ⊃ B), then Γ, A ` B (the converse of the Deduction Theorem)
3. (43.3) if ∆ is a closed set of wffs, then if ∆ ` A then ∆ ` ∧xA.
8.5 Linkage Meta-theorems for QS
1. (43.4) If A is an instance of a tautological of Q, then `Q A.
2. (43.5) Soundness, consistency of a system: if ` A, then  A (i.e., every theorem
of QS is logically valid).
Soundness proof has same pattern in all systems:
(a) All axioms are valid.
(b) RoI (mp) preserves validity.
Shows Kon of QS (of a system).
(a) Simple konsistency: for no wff A, `QS A and `QS∼ A.
(b) Absolute konsistency: there is one A s.t. 0QS A.
E.g., p
′
is not valid in QS (2 p′ so 0 p′).
8.6 Con
1. (43.6) if Γ ` A then there is a finite subset ∆ of Γ s.t. ∆ ` A (definition of a derivation).
2. (43.7) if Γ ` A, then Γ  A.
3. (43.9) if Con Γ ∪ {∼ A}, then Γ ` A.
9 First-order Theories
1. A first-order theory (fot) K is the same as a logical formal system.
2. Let K be a first-order theory equal to all of QS plus possibly additional proper axioms
(closed).
3. Let K + A be the system resulting from adding wff A as an axiom to K.
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9.1 Meta-theorems of K
1. (45.6a) (If A is closed)
If 0K A, then K + {∼ A} is a konsistent fot ≡ If Kon K + {∼ A}, then `K A
(i.e., if 0K A, then Kon K + {∼ A} ≡ if Kon K + {A}, then `K A).
2. (45.6b) (If A is closed and ) If 0K∼ A, then KonK + {A} ≡ if Kon K + {A}, then
`K A.
3. A model of system K makes all theorems of K true.
4. (45.8) If a fot has a model, then it is konsistent (analog in PS: if SAT Γ, then Con Γ).
Proof: does not require completeness
(a) Spoze a fot K has a model, yet Kon K
(b) `∼ A and ` A (by a and def. of Kon).
(c) M∼ A and M A (by a and def. of a model).
(d) c contradicts truth.
(e) ∴ the claim is true.
5. A system S
′
is an extension of a system S iff every theorem of S is a theorem of S
′
.
6. If S
′
is an extension of S, then any model of S
′
is a model of S.
7. A system is negation complete iff for every sentence (closed wff) A of S either A or
the negation of A (∼ A) is a theorem of S (i.e., `S A or `S∼ A; like fullness).
8. A system is not negation complete iff ∃ a sentence (closed wff) A of S s.t. neither A
or its negation (∼ A) are theorems of S (i.e., 0S A and 0S∼ A).
9. QS is not negation complete because 0QS p′ , 0QS∼ p′ .
10. (45.10) Lindenbaum’s Lemma for fot: if Kon K, then ∃ a fot K ′ that is a konsis-
tent, negation-complete extension of K with the same wffs of K.
11. (45.13) if Kon K, then ∃ a fot K ′ that is a konsistent, closed, and negation-complete
extension of K.
12. (45.14) Any konsistent, closed, and negation-complete fot has a denumerable model.
13. (45.13 + 45.14 = 45.15) Any konsistent fot has a denumerable model.
Proof:
(a) 45.13 + 45.14
(b) if S
′
is an extension of S, then any model of S
′
is a model of S.
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14. (45.20) The Compactness Theorem: If every finite subset of the set of proper
axioms of a fot K has a model, then K has a model.
(45.15)
Kon k
L.L. for FOT
(45.10)
k’: Kon, negation−complete,
closed extension of k
(45.13)
denumerable model
k’ has a(45.14)
(syntax) k has adenumerable model
(semantics)
if Kon k, then k has a denumerable model
15. (45.8 + 45.15 = 45.18) The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem: If a fot has a
model, then it has a denumerable model.
16. (46.1) Semantic Completeness of QS: if Q A, then `QS A.
Proof of the contrapositive: if 0QS A, then 2Q A.
(a) Spoze given 45.15.
(b) A is closed.
(c) Spoze 0QS A (show 2Q A).
(d) Kon QS + {∼ A} (by 45.6a).
(e) QS + {∼ A} has a denumerable model M (by d and 45.15).
(f) M∼ A (by e and the def. of a model of a sytem).
(g) 2M A (by f and the def. of truth).
(h) 2QS A (by g).
(i) ∴ the claim is true.
17. (46.2) ‘Strong’ Semantic Completeness of QS: if Γ Q A, then Γ `QS A.
18. (43.7 + 46.2 = 46.3) Γ Q A iff Γ `QS A.
10 Isomorphism of Models, Axioms of Arithmetic, and
Non-standard Models
1. Q=S is QS + new axioms.
2. An interpretation I is a normal interpretation of Q iff I assigns identity to F ??′ .
3. If K has Q=S 1 and Q=S 2 as axioms, then K=.
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4. An interpretation I is a normal model of a fot K= iff I is a normal interpretation
and I is a model of K=.
5. Adequacy of Q=S
(a) if Q A, then `Q= A.
(b) if IN A︸ ︷︷ ︸
A is true for any normal interpretation
, then `Q=S A, where IN is a normal model of
Q (e.g., A = F ??′xx, x = x).
6. (47.2) if Kon K=, then K= has a countable normal model ≡ if K= has no countable
normal model, then Kon K=.
7. (47.3) if IN A, then `Q=S A (i.e., Q=S is semantically complete).
Proof:
(a) Spoze C is a closed wff of Q and IN C, for all normal interpretations.
(b) Q=S + {∼ C}.
(c) If M is any normal model for Q=S + {∼ C}, then M C and M∼ C.
(d) c contradicts the def. of truth.
(e) Q=S + {∼ C} has no normal model (by d).
(f) Kon Q=S (by the contrapositive of 47.2).
(g) `Q C (by the contrapositive of 45.6a)
10.1 Example
Prove if (if some closed wff A is true under some interpretation I (of a fot K), then A is
true for all interpretations of K), then K is NC.
Proof of the contrapositive: if K is not NC, then (if some closed wff A is true under some
interpretation I (of a fot K), then A is not true for all interpretations of K).
1. Spoze K is not NC.
2. `K A and `K∼ A, for some closed wff A (by 1).
3. Kon K + {∼ A} and Kon K + {A} (by 2 and 45.6a and 45.6b, resp).
4. Kon K (by 3).
5. K has a denumerable model M (by 4 and 45.15).
6. M∼ A and M ′ A (by 2 and 5).
7. ∴ A is true under some model, but not all.
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10.2 Isomorphism of Models
isomorphic: ‘same form, but different content’ (has all the same truths)
Let K be a fot and M , M
′
are 2 models of K with domains D, D′ , resp.
M (c) = d ∈ D, M ′ (c) = d′ ∈ D′ ,
M (F n) = R, M
′
(F n) = F
′
M is isomorphic to M
′
(i.e., M ' M ′) iff there is a 1-1 correspondence between D and D′
s.t. M (c) = d iff M
′
(c) = d
′
, i.e., ≺ d1, . . . , dn  ∈ M (F n) iff ≺ d′1, . . . d′n ∈M ′ (F n).
To be isomorphic, M and M
′
must have domains with the same cardinality.
1. (48.2) if M and M
′
are isomorphic models of a fot K, then M A iff M ′ A, for a
wff A of K.
2. (48.3) If all normal models of a K= are isomorphic (have all the same truths), then
K= is NC (i.e., if K= is categorical, then K= is NC).
Proof of the contrapositive: if K= is not NC, then all of its normal models are not
isomorphic.
(a) Spoze K= is not NC, for some closed wff A (i.e., 0K= A and 0K=∼ A).
(b) Kon K= + {∼ A} and Kon K= + {A} (by a and 45.6a and 45.6b, resp).
(c) These two fots have countable models, call them M , M
′
(by b and 47.2)
(d) 2M A and M ′ A (by a and def. of a model).
(e) M and M
′
are not isomorphic.
10.3 Axioms of Arithmetic
1. Arithmetic can be modeled using standard first-order theory with identity.
2. function Sx is ‘the successor of x’ (e.g., S5 = 5 + 1 = 6).
10.4 Non-standard Models
Q=S + axioms of arithmetic = Theory R.
M
′
is a model of R′ and ∴ a model of R. ∴ R has a non-standard model.
11 Go¨edel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Recall that N is a formal theory (fot) of arithmetic.
Abbreviation: An (x) = the property with one free variable x that has Go¨edel # (g#) = n.
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There is a proof in N that 2 has the even property, i.e., `N E (2).
Proofs also get g#’s
A number-theoretic property W ( n︸︷︷︸
g# of a wff A (x)
, k︸︷︷︸
g# of a proof in N of A (n)
) holds between natural
numbers n and k iff
1. n is the g# of a wff A (x) with one free variable x, and
2. k is the g# of a proof in N of A (n).
W is representable in N, meaning there is a wff B (x, y) in N with free variables x and y
s.t. for all natural numbers n and k:
1. if W (n, k) holds, then `N B (n, k).
2. if W (n, k) does not hold, then `N∼ B (n, k).
E.g., if 7100 were the g# associated with P (x), being prime, then we would have
`N (y) ∼ B (7100, y), where (y) is the universal quantifier y.
Now consider the common property C (x) = (y) ∼ B (x, y), and C (x) has g# = m.
g# Property with one free variable
i Ai (x) = the property with one free variable
...
...
54 A54 (x) = O (x), x is odd
...
...
540 A540 (x) = E (x), x is even
...
...
600 A600 (x) = O (x), x is odd
...
...
7100 A7100 (x) = P (x), x is prime
...
...
m Am (x) = C (x), there is no proof in N
that x has the property with g# = x,
i.e., (y) ∼ B (x, y);
C (m) = (y) ∼ B (m, y)
C (m) is the Go¨edel formula G.
Let us marry W and C.
20
W (n, k) holds iff k is the g# of a proof (in N) of An (n).
Thus, W (m, k) holds iff k is the g# of a proof (in N) of Am (m).
So W (m, k) holds iff k is the g# of a proof (in N) of G (which says there is no proof).
So W (m, k) holds for some k iff G is provable in N.
We are now ready for the first part of Go¨edel’s incompleteness result.
Consider the question: Is there a proof in N that Am (m)?
But again, Am (m) = C (m) = G.
So our question is equivalent to: Is G provable in N, i.e., is `N G?
Proof that if G is provable in N, then N inconsistent.
1. Spoze `N G, i.e., `N C (m).
2. Then `N (y) ∼ B (m, y), by the def. of C (m).
3. But we know that G is provable in N iff W (m, k) holds for some k.
4. So, from (1), we have W (m, k) holds for some number k, call it k
′
; so, W (m, k
′
).
5. Since B represents W , it follows from (4) that `N B (m, k′).
6. But it follows from (2), by quantifier instantiation or by the axioms of N, that `N ∼ B (m, k′).
7. Then, from (5) and (6), N is an inkonsistent fot.
∴ if N is konsistent, then G is not provable in N is true. 
G says of itself, it is not provable. So, if G is provable, then G is not provable. So, if we
assume N has its intended model, then G is not provable.
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